In this paper we provide a direct test of the inequality aversion hypothesis based on aggregate outcomes using the Patron Game, a version of a Public Good Game that mandates that only one member of a group contributes to the public good. We find evidence that inequality aversion does not play any role, as the average contribution does not increase when the distribution of endowments is manipulated to generate a situation of favorable inequality for the patron, compared to the case in which there is no inequality ex ante.
机构:
Icahn Sch Med Mt Sinai, Div Plast & Reconstruct Surg, New York, NY 10029 USAIcahn Sch Med Mt Sinai, Div Plast & Reconstruct Surg, New York, NY 10029 USA
Mandelbaum, Max
Taub, Peter J.
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Icahn Sch Med Mt Sinai, Div Plast & Reconstruct Surg, New York, NY 10029 USAIcahn Sch Med Mt Sinai, Div Plast & Reconstruct Surg, New York, NY 10029 USA