The Patron Game with Heterogeneous Endowments: A Case Against Inequality Aversion

被引:2
|
作者
Filippin, Antonio [1 ]
Raimondi, Manuela [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Milan, Dept Econ, Via Conservatorio 7, I-20122 Milan, Italy
[2] Univ Parma, Dept Econ, Via Kennedy 6, I-43125 Parma, Italy
来源
ECONOMIST-NETHERLANDS | 2016年 / 164卷 / 01期
关键词
Public good; Inequality aversion; Altruism; PUBLIC-GOODS EXPERIMENTS; MAXIMIN PREFERENCES; VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS; FREE-RIDE; COOPERATION; FAIRNESS; RECIPROCITY; EFFICIENCY; MARKET; COMPETITION;
D O I
10.1007/s10645-015-9268-6
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In this paper we provide a direct test of the inequality aversion hypothesis based on aggregate outcomes using the Patron Game, a version of a Public Good Game that mandates that only one member of a group contributes to the public good. We find evidence that inequality aversion does not play any role, as the average contribution does not increase when the distribution of endowments is manipulated to generate a situation of favorable inequality for the patron, compared to the case in which there is no inequality ex ante.
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页码:69 / 81
页数:13
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