Consistent solutions for cooperative games with externalities

被引：21
|
作者：
Huang, CY
Sjöström, T
机构：
[1] Natl Taiwan Univ, Dept Econ, Taipei 10764, Taiwan
[2] Penn State Univ, Dept Econ, University Pk, PA 16802 USA
来源：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2003年 / 43卷 / 02期
关键词：
recursive core; externalities;
D O I：
10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00011-3
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
In order to calculate the worth of a coalition of players, the coalition needs to predict the actions of outsiders. We propose that, for a given solution concept, such predictions should be made by applying the solution concept to the "reduced society" consisting of the non-members. We illustrate by computing the r-core for the case of Bertrand competition with differentiated commodities. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.
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页码：196 / 213
页数：18
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