When and why do IPO firms manage earnings?

被引:39
|
作者
Sletten, Ewa [1 ]
Ertimur, Yonca [2 ]
Sunder, Jayanthi [3 ]
Weber, Joseph [4 ]
机构
[1] Boston Coll, 140 Commonwealth Ave,Fulton 552 B, Chestnut Hill, MA 02482 USA
[2] Univ Colorado, Leeds Sch Business, 419 UCB,995 Regent Dr, Boulder, CO 80309 USA
[3] Univ Arizona, 1130 E Helen St,Suite 301G, Tucson, AZ 85712 USA
[4] MIT, Sloan Sch Management, E62-664,100 Main St, Cambridge, MA 02142 USA
关键词
IPO lockup; Earnings management; INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS; ACCRUAL ESTIMATION ERRORS; VENTURE CAPITALISTS; LITIGATION RISK; QUALITY; MARKET; PERFORMANCE; INCENTIVES; COMPANIES; LOCKUPS;
D O I
10.1007/s11142-018-9445-3
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
There is significant disagreement about whether, when, and why IPO firms manage earnings. We precisely identify the timing and motives behind earnings management by IPO firms. The period around an IPO is characterized by two events: the IPO itself and the lockup expiration. Both the raising of capital at the IPO and the exit by pre-IPO shareholders at lockup expiration create incentives for firms to manage earnings. To disentangle the effect of these events, we examine quarterly, rather than annual, abnormal accruals. We find no evidence of income-increasing earnings management before the IPO. However, IPO firms exhibit positive abnormal accruals in the quarter before and the quarter of the lockup expiration. Positive abnormal accruals are concentrated in less scrutinized firms and firms with high selling by pre-IPO shareholders. Moreover, we find that these accruals subsequently reverse and that such reversals contribute to long-run IPO underperformance.
引用
收藏
页码:872 / 906
页数:35
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