The differing effects of individual and group incentive pay on worker separation: evidence using Finnish panel data

被引:2
|
作者
Jones, Derek C. [1 ]
Kalmi, Panu [2 ]
Kato, Takao [3 ]
Makinen, Mikko [4 ]
机构
[1] Hamilton Coll, Dept Econ, Clinton, NY 13323 USA
[2] Univ Vaasa, Dept Econ, Vaasa, Finland
[3] Colgate Univ, Dept Econ, Hamilton, NY 13346 USA
[4] Bank Finland, POB 160, Helsinki 00101, Finland
来源
关键词
Job mobility; performance related pay; profit sharing; wage inequality; worker separation; PERFORMANCE PAY; FINANCIAL PARTICIPATION; EARNINGS LOSSES; EMPLOYMENT STABILITY; GENDER-DIFFERENCES; DISPLACED WORKERS; LABOR TURNOVER; JOB MOBILITY; IMPACT; COMPENSATION;
D O I
10.1080/09585192.2019.1691624
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
We investigate the role of individual incentive (II) and group incentive (GI) pay as determinants of worker separation using a large panel data set from Finland during 1997-2006. For white-collar workers, GI pay is associated significantly with an increased probability of separation (diminished employment stability), but in large firms only. For blue-collar workers, II pay is associated with a decreased probability of separation (enhanced employment stability), in both small and large firms. By providing results for different forms of performance pay in a single study, some of our findings are novel. In accounting for differences in our empirical findings compared to those in earlier studies, our results suggest that outcomes depend on the differing institutional contexts found in coordinated market economies (such as Finland) and liberal market economies.
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页码:4792 / 4819
页数:28
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