A Probabilistic Mechanism Design for Online Auctions

被引:3
|
作者
Zhang, Jie [1 ,2 ,4 ,5 ]
Li, Linjing [1 ]
Wang, Fei-Yue [1 ,2 ,3 ,4 ]
机构
[1] Chinese Acad Sci, Inst Automat, State Key Lab Management & Control Complex Syst, Beijing 100190, Peoples R China
[2] Qingdao Acad Intelligent Ind, Inst Parallel Econ, Qingdao 266000, Shandong, Peoples R China
[3] Natl Univ Def Technol, Res Ctr Computat Expt & Parallel Syst Technol, Changsha 410073, Hunan, Peoples R China
[4] Univ Chinese Acad Sci, Sch Econ & Management, Beijing 100049, Peoples R China
[5] Univ Chinese Acad Sci, Sch Comp & Control Engn, Beijing 100049, Peoples R China
来源
IEEE ACCESS | 2017年 / 5卷
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Mechanism design; online auctions; randomized mechanisms; e-commerce; computational experiments; probabilistic mechanism design; AD AUCTIONS;
D O I
10.1109/ACCESS.2017.2705120
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
Recently, there has been a rapid growth of the online auctions in e-commerce platforms, in which small and/or medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) heavily depend on the advertising systems. In this paper, we design flexible mechanisms to reduce the competition of SMEs without affecting competitive large companies in order to maximize the profit of e-commerce platform and to keep the ecosystem healthy. A probabilistic pricing mechanism design approach is investigated for online auctions. Utilizing this approach, we introduce the notation of simple mechanisms as a tool for designing new mechanisms. Based on a simple and a classical, the proposed mechanism probabilistic mechanisms are designed and their properties are analyzed. Furthermore, we devise two mechanism design algorithms for different application scenarios. Experiments are presented to demonstrate the flexibility and the effectiveness of the proposed probabilistic mechanism design approach.
引用
收藏
页码:10782 / 10794
页数:13
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] A Probabilistic Price Mechanism Design for Online Auctions
    Zhang, Jie
    Li, Linjing
    Wang, Fei-Yue
    [J]. 2016 IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SYSTEMS, MAN, AND CYBERNETICS (SMC), 2016, : 4860 - 4865
  • [2] Interleaving cryptography and mechanism design the case of online auctions
    Elkind, E
    Lipmaa, H
    [J]. FINANCIAL CRYPTOGRAPHY, 2004, 3110 : 117 - 131
  • [3] Optinial design of online auctions
    Chen Sheng-li
    Luo Yun-feng
    Dai Bao
    [J]. PROCEEDINGS OF 2007 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MANAGEMENT SCIENCE & ENGINEERING (14TH) VOLS 1-3, 2007, : 64 - 70
  • [4] When snipers become predators: Can mechanism design save online auctions?
    Bapna, R
    [J]. COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM, 2003, 46 (12) : 152 - 158
  • [5] Data driven design for online industrial auctions
    Ye, Qing Chuan
    Rhuggenaath, Jason
    Zhang, Yingqian
    Verwer, Sicco
    Hilgeman, Michiel Jurgen
    [J]. ANNALS OF MATHEMATICS AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, 2021, 89 (07) : 675 - 691
  • [6] Data driven design for online industrial auctions
    Qing Chuan Ye
    Jason Rhuggenaath
    Yingqian Zhang
    Sicco Verwer
    Michiel Jurgen Hilgeman
    [J]. Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence, 2021, 89 : 675 - 691
  • [7] Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities
    Jehiel, P
    Moldovanu, B
    Stacchetti, E
    [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1999, 85 (02) : 258 - 293
  • [8] Multi-period optimal design of online auctions
    Chen Sheng-li
    Yang Xiao-hua
    Luo Yun-feng
    [J]. PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON DATA, PRIVACY, AND E-COMMERCE, 2007, : 403 - 405
  • [9] Analysis and design for multi-unit online auctions
    Wang, Hong
    [J]. EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH, 2017, 258 (03) : 1191 - 1203
  • [10] Analysis and design of business-to-consumer online auctions
    Bapna, R
    Goes, P
    Gupta, A
    [J]. MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 2003, 49 (01) : 85 - 101