Interleaving cryptography and mechanism design the case of online auctions

被引：0
|
作者：
Elkind, E
Lipmaa, H
机构：
[1] Princeton Univ, Dept Comp Sci, Princeton, NJ 08544 USA
[2] Helsinki Univ Technol, Lab Theoret Comp Sci, Dept Comp Sci & Engn, FI-02015 Espoo, Finland
来源：
FINANCIAL CRYPTOGRAPHY | 2004年 / 3110卷
关键词：
auctions; cognitive costs; cryptography; mechanism design; privacy;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
TP39 [计算机的应用];
学科分类号：
081203 ; 0835 ;
摘要：
We propose a new cryptographically protected multi-round auction mechanism for online auctions. This auction mechanism is designed to provide (in this order) security, cognitive convenience, and round-effectiveness. One can vary internal parameters of the mechanism to trade off bid privacy and cognitive costs, or cognitive costs and the number of rounds. We are aware of no previous work that interleaves cryptography explicitly with the mechanism design.
引用
收藏
页码：117 / 131
页数：15
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