Do takeover laws matter? Evidence from five decades of hostile takeovers

被引：196
|
作者：
Cain, Matthew D. [1 ]
McKeon, Stephen B. [2 ]
Solomon, Steven Davidoff [3 ]
机构：
[1] US Secur & Exchange Commiss, Div Econ & Risk Anal, Washington, DC 20549 USA
[2] Univ Oregon, Lundquist Coll Business, Eugene, OR 97403 USA
[3] Univ Calif Berkeley, Sch Law, Boalt Hall, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA
来源：
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS | 2017年 / 124卷 / 03期
关键词：
Hostile takeovers; Corporate governance; Mergers and acquisitions; Law; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; SHAREHOLDER WEALTH; EMPIRICAL-ANALYSIS; ANTITAKEOVER LEGISLATION; MANAGERIAL PREFERENCES; FIRM VALUE; STATUTES; OWNERSHIP; DEFENSES; MARKET;
D O I：
10.1016/j.jfineco.2017.04.003
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
This study evaluates the relation between hostile takeovers and 17 takeover laws from 1965 to 2014. Using a data set of largely exogenous legal changes, we find that certain takeover laws, such as poison pill and business combination laws, have no discernible impact on hostile activity, while others such as fair price laws have reduced hostile takeovers. We construct a Takeover Index from the laws and find that higher takeover protection is associated with lower firm value, consistent with entrenchment and agency costs. However, conditional on a bid, firms with more protection achieve higher premiums, consistent with increased bargaining power. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码：464 / 485
页数：22
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