Optimal contracts and the manufacturer's pricing strategies in a supply chain with an inequity-averse retailer

Studies in the supply chain literature have typically focused on profit or revenue maximization and assumed that agents within the supply chain are self-interested and only care about their own monetary payoffs. Research in these areas, however, rarely considers an important phenomenon called inequity aversion in which the object pursued by agents within the supply chain is not only their own profit maximization but also the equity of profit allocation. In fact, when agents within a supply chain collaborate with each other to serve a market, the scheme of profit allocation between them usually plays a determinate role in cooperation. Taking into account the impact of agents' behavior of inequity aversion on the coordination of the supply chain, this paper investigates the optimal contracts and the manufacturer's pricing strategies in a single-manufacturer and single-retailer supply chain. In this way, we obtain two interesting results: (1) the retailer's equity aversion largely affects the manufacturer's decision making, which is not always bad for the manufacturer; and (2) the retailer's inequity aversion as well as the consumer's price-sensitive coefficient plays a dominant role in the manufacturer's decision making.