Trust and reciprocity with transparency and repeated interactions

被引:47
|
作者
Kanagaretnam, Kiridaran [1 ]
Mestelman, Stuart [2 ]
Nainar, S. M. Khalid [1 ,3 ]
Shehata, Mohamed [1 ,4 ]
机构
[1] McMaster Univ, DeGroote Sch Business, Hamilton, ON L8S 4M4, Canada
[2] McMaster Univ, Dept Econ, Hamilton, ON L8S 4M4, Canada
[3] Indian Sch Business, Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh, India
[4] Kuwait Univ, Coll Business Adm, Kuwait, Kuwait
关键词
Transparency; Trust; Reciprocity; Repeated interaction; Business alliances; SOX; COOPERATION; REPUTATION;
D O I
10.1016/j.jbusres.2009.03.007
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper uses data from a controlled laboratory environment to Study the impact of transparency (i.e., complete information versus incomplete information) and repeated interactions oil the level of trust and trustworthiness (reciprocity) in air investment game setting. The key findings of the study are that transparency (complete information) significantly increases trusting behavior in one-shot interactions. This result persists in repeated interactions. Further, transparency appears important for trustworthiness in one-shot interactions. In addition, repeated interaction increases trust and reciprocity with or without transparency. These results Suggest that transparency is important in building trust in business environments Such as alliances and joint ventures which are loosely connected organizational forms that bring together otherwise independent firms. It also provides Support for the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) and similar legislation elsewhere which attempt to regain investors' trust in corporate management and financial markets by stipulating enhanced disclosures. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:241 / 247
页数:7
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