Ontological Conflict in Library and Information Science: A Comparison of Gnoli's Ontological Pluralism and Hjorland's Ontological Monism

Purpose: This article aims to discuss the relationship between philosophy and library and information science from an ontological point of view. Method: This study applies a literature-based analysis to library and information science. Gnoli's articles on ontological pluralism and Hjorland's articles on ontological monism are compared and examined. Results: Three points of contention between Gnoli's pluralism and Hjorland's monism are identified. The first is whether dualism in the philosophy of mind is unscientific. The second concerns what comprises a document. The third is how to think about abstract entities. Regarding these issues. the following three points are clarified. First. dualism and pluralism in the philosophy of mind cannot be easily dismissed as unscientific. Second. while Gnoli seeks to acknowledge mentefacts as abstract entities. Hjorland believes that it is sufficient to consider documents as material entities, so the conflict between dualism and monism in the philosophy of mind is not the only problem when considering ontology. Third, the question of abstract entities cannot be answered conclusively by their own arguments. However, a comparative review of the arguments of Gnoli and Hjorland provides clues to resolving these issues in ontology. The key is whether we can solve the research problems in library and information science as well as provide satisfactory explanations of the field's central phenomena.