Dynamic core of fuzzy dynamical cooperative games

We use in this paper the viability/capturability approach for studying the problem of characterizing the dynamic core of a dynamic cooperative game defined in a characteristic function form. In order to allow coalitions to evolve, we embed them in the set of fuzzy coalitions. Hence, we define the dynamic core as a set-valued map associating with each fuzzy coalition and each time the set of allotments is such that their payoffs at that time to the fuzzy coalition are larger than or equal to the one assigned by the characteristic function of the game. We shall characterize this core through the (generalized) derivatives of a valuation function associated with the game. We shall provide its explicit formula, characterize its epigraph as a viable-capture basin of the epigraph of the characteristic function of the fuzzy dynamical cooperative game, use the tangential properties of such basins for proving that the valuation function is a solution to a Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs partial differential equation and use this function and its derivatives for characterizing the dynamic core.