Beyond trial-and-error in a selectionist psychology

A common criticism of a selectionist psychology is that the mechanism of overt behavioral variability and environmental selection cannot account for instances of seemingly novel, intelligent behavior. However, behavioral novelty is quite easily accounted for in much the same manner as it is in phylogenetic selection-through an appreciation of historicity. Nonetheless, the issue of novelty is closely related to another issue that is problematic for a selectionist psychology, namely the issue of what constitutes an ontogenetic adaptation. Ontogenetic adaptations simply cannot be defined purely by reference to behavioral units. A solution to this quandary emerges by considering how phylogenetic selection distinguishes between codical and material units. The former are inferred, relational, and persist; the latter are directly observed and temporary. A similar distinction in a selectionist psychology exists between associations and behaviors, and I argue that ontogenetic selection is for associations not behaviors. Such a stance does not require a conceptual nervous system, although it does subsume operant and classical conditioning phenomena under a common conceptual umbrella. Throughout the paper, various analogies between phylogenetic and ontogenetic selection are considered: Codical units (e.g., genotypes, associations) vs. material units (e.g., phenotypes, behavior), preparedness vs. fitness, instinctive drift vs. allometry, associative drift vs. genetic drift, associants vs. alleles. The object of such comparisons is not to claim that they are accurate but rather to stretch and push the overall analogy between phylogenetic and ontogenetic selectionism so as to delineate the latter more accurately.