A methodology for resource allocation and routing in integrated-services networks with quality of service requirements

We present an approach to the admission control, resource allocation and routing problem in connection-oriented networks that offer multiple services to users. Users' preferences are summarized by means of their utility functions, and each user is allowed to request more than one type of service. Each requested service may be delivered over one of many possible routes, and must satisfy certain Quality of Service (QoS) requirements. We assume that the relation between QoS and resource allocation is given (see [2]), and incorporate it as a constraint into a static optimization problem. The objective is to determine the amount of required resources and route for each type of service so as to satisfy the QoS requirements and maximize a welfare function that is equal to the sum of the users' utilities. We describe a competitive market economy that achieves the objective and satisfies the informational constraints imposed by the nature of the decentralized resource allocation and routing problem. Below we briefly describe the market economy, the problem's information structure and the market mechanism. The market economy consists of the following four types of agents: resource providers, service providers, users and an auctioneer. The resource providers, service providers and users are price takers. They act as if their behavior has no effect on the equilibrium prices reached by the market allocation process. In our market the resources at each link are sold as raw material to the service providers. The service providers buy the resources from the resource providers. Using these resources, they set up services and the corresponding prices for each unit of these services. Then, they sell these services to the users. The users are utility maximizers. They respond to the prices announced by the service provider by specifying the amount and type of services they request. The auctioneer adjusts the prices per unit of resource at each link based on the excess demand at that link. The resource provider, service provider and the auctioneer know the network's topology and the available resources, but have no information about the number of users that may request service, and of the users' utilities. Each user knows its own preferences expressed by its utility function, but has no information about the network's topology, the available resources, and the number of other users requesting service. The above features describe the informational constraints imposed by the nature of the decentralized resource allocation and routing problem.