Crises, Liquidity Shocks, and Fire Sales at Commercial Banks

被引:23
|
作者
Boyson, Nicole [1 ]
Helwege, Jean [2 ]
Jindra, Jan [3 ]
机构
[1] Northeastern Univ, Boston, MA 02115 USA
[2] Univ S Carolina, Columbia, SC 29208 USA
[3] Secur & Exchange Commiss, San Francisco, CA USA
关键词
RISK; MARKET; CONTAGION; REGULATIONS; EQUILIBRIUM; RELUCTANCE; ISSUANCES; VOLUNTARY; BORROW; DEBT;
D O I
10.1111/fima.12056
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
If liquidity shortages cause financial crises, a lender of last resort can provide funds to banks facing potential fire sales. However, if funding problems primarily occur at banks with existing solvency problems, then government liquidity programs may not spur bank lending. We find that commercial bank funding does not typically dry up in a crisis, not even during the subprime crisis. Rather, weak banks are more likely to borrow less. Furthermore, banks rely more on deposits and newly issued equity than fire sales. When they do sell assets, they cherry pick assets in order to alleviate pressure from capital regulations.
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页码:857 / 884
页数:28
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