The effect of institutional investors on the level and mix of CEO compensation

被引：247
|
作者：
David, P [1 ]
Kochhar, R
Levitas, E
机构：
[1] Nanyang Technol Univ, Singapore 2263, Singapore
[2] Purdue Univ, Krannert Sch, W Lafayette, IN 47907 USA
[3] Texas A&M Univ, College Stn, TX 77843 USA
来源：
ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL | 1998年 / 41卷 / 02期
关键词：
D O I：
10.5465/257102
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This study investigated the influence of institutional investors on CEO compensation policy. Results suggest that institutional owners that have only an investment relationship with a firm influence compensation in accordance with shareholder preferences to (1) lower its level and (2) increase the proportion of long-term incentives in total compensation; However, institutions that depend on a firm for their own business are not able to influence compensation in this manner. This study extends prior research by supporting the viewpoint that the nature of ownership in a firm is an important determinant of CEO compensation.
引用
收藏
页码：200 / 208
页数：9
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