Assessment of groups in a network organization based on the Shapley group value

被引:2
|
作者
Flores, Ramon [1 ]
Molina, Elisenda [2 ]
Tejada, Juan [3 ]
机构
[1] Fac Matemat, IMUS Dept Geometria & Topol, Seville, Spain
[2] Univ Carlos III Madrid, Dept Estadist, Madrid 28270, Spain
[3] Univ Complutense Madrid, IMI, Dept Estadist & Invest Operat, E-28040 Madrid, Spain
关键词
Centrality; Shapley group value; Myerson value; Network organization; GAME-THEORETIC APPROACH; SOCIAL NETWORKS; CENTRALITY;
D O I
10.1016/j.dss.2016.01.001
中图分类号
TP18 [人工智能理论];
学科分类号
081104 ; 0812 ; 0835 ; 1405 ;
摘要
The focus of this paper is the assessment of groups of agents or units in a network organization. Given a social network, the relations between agents are modeled by means of a graph, and its functionality will be codified by means of a cooperative game. Building on previous work of Gomez et al. (2003) for the individual case, we propose a Myerson group value to evaluate the ability of each group of agents inside the social network to achieve the organization's goals. We analyze this centrality measure, and in particular we offer several decompositions that facilitate obtaining a precise interpretation of it. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:97 / 105
页数:9
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