The political economy of endogenous taxation and redistribution

被引:2
|
作者
Dolmas, J [1 ]
Huffman, GW [1 ]
机构
[1] FED RESERVE BANK DALLAS, DALLAS, TX USA
关键词
voting; political economy; redistributive taxation;
D O I
10.1016/S0165-1765(97)81904-0
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper examines a simple dynamic model in which agents vote over capital income taxation and redistributive transfers. We show that in equilibrium the typical agent's preferences over the tax rate are single-peaked and derive a closed-form solution for the majority-rule tax rate. We also show that high levels of initial wealth inequality can place the economy on the 'wrong side of the Laffer curve'. (C) 1997 Elsevier Science S.A.
引用
收藏
页码:223 / 227
页数:5
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