Moral reasoning, moral action, and the moral atmosphere of sport

Whether sport builds character is a perennial question. It has been argued separately that sport participation contributes to, detracts from, or is neutral when it comes to fostering certain valued traits and dispositions. In this paper we revisit this debate by examining the work of more recent and empirically based contributions to the debate (Bredemeier et al., 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1994). Rather than propose certain philosophical arguments to explicate the nature of the relationship between sport participation and character development, their empirical researches attempt to ascertain whether or not engaging in sport has a positive or detrimental effect on a persons' character. Their methodology rejects the study of traits and dispositions and incorporates the cognitive developmental concept of moral judgment as a central character indicator. They consequently assess whether or not engaging in sport effects the maturity of the participants' judgment. In this essay we argue that the reliability and validity of their research is damaged because of the problematic methodology employed. The research is not reliable because their methods combine insights from two different theories while staying loyal to neither. This is problematic since it is the originating theory that gives the method its raison d'etre. We argue that the validity of the research is similarly flawed because the complex and multifaceted concept of character is reduced to the narrowly defined and primarily cognitive ability of making judgments. We conclude with a plea for greater collaborative efforts in this thorny issue between philosophers and social scientists.