The relation between earnings-based measures in firm debt contracts and CEO pay sensitivity to earnings

被引:16
|
作者
Rhodes, Adrienne [1 ]
机构
[1] Texas A&M Univ, Dept Accounting, 4353 TAMU, College Stn, TX 77843 USA
来源
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS | 2016年 / 61卷 / 01期
关键词
Executive compensation; Debt contracts; Covenants; Agency costs; EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; PERFORMANCE; INFORMATION; INVESTMENT; INCENTIVES; AGENCY; COSTS;
D O I
10.1016/j.jacceco.2015.11.002
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
I investigate how implicit incentives provided by earnings-based debt covenants affect the structure of CEO compensation contracts. This provides a new and unique view of how the CEO's incentives are shaped by not only his compensation contract but also debt contracts. I find when debt contracts contain an earnings-based covenant, the CEO's pay sensitivity to earnings is muted. Additionally, I find some evidence that pay sensitivity to earnings varies with earnings-based covenant slack. This study provides evidence consistent with shareholders rebalancing the CEO's earnings incentives in the presence of earnings-based covenants, thereby tilting incentives away from earnings performance. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码:1 / 22
页数:22
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