EARNINGS-BASED COMPENSATION CONTRACTS UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION

被引：0
|
作者：
Miglo, Anton [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Guelph, Guelph, ON N1G 2W1, Canada
来源：
MANCHESTER SCHOOL | 2009年 / 77卷 / 02期
关键词：
OPERATING PERFORMANCE; STOCK-OPTIONS; FIRMS; RISK; CORPORATIONS; INCENTIVES; LIQUIDITY; SELECTION; TURNOVER; MATURITY;
D O I：
10.1111/j.1467-9957.2008.02095.x
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We analyse a model with two-dimensional asymmetric information in which the employer has better information about the firm's earnings potential. The employee's contract consists of an annual bonus and stock options. We explain (1) how different degrees of asymmetric information about short-term earnings versus long-term earnings affect optimal contracts and (2) why firms offering more options have higher short-term performance and lower long-term performance. This provides new insights into the structure of earnings-based compensation.
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页码：225 / 243
页数：19
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