Managerial Placement and Entrenchment

被引:0
|
作者
Tao, Qizhi [1 ]
Zhao, Zhao [1 ]
Zhang, Mingming [1 ]
Xiang, Xueman [1 ]
机构
[1] Southwestern Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Finance, Chengdu 611130, Sichuan, Peoples R China
关键词
entrenchment; managerial investor; private placement; PRIVATE EQUITY PLACEMENTS; OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE; AGENCY COSTS; PERFORMANCE; DISCOUNTS; CHOICE; FIRMS;
D O I
10.1080/1540496X.2018.1474739
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Using data on companies that have implemented private placements in China from 2011 to 2016, we examine the discount on private placements, short-term stock returns, and long-term performance after the placements. Our goal is to determine whether the prevailing certification and entrenchment hypotheses can explain managerial placements. We find that the participation of managerial investors has a significant and negative impact on short-term stock returns. Such a negative effect can also be found on issuing companies' long-term profitability. Moreover, managerial placements have a higher discount than nonmanagerial placements. Our findings suggest that managerial placement is consistent with the entrenchment hypothesis but not the certification hypothesis.
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页码:3366 / 3383
页数:18
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