Evolutionary Game Analysis on the Major Stakeholders in Disabled Accessible Tourism

被引:0
|
作者
Wang, Wenke [1 ,2 ]
Wang, Hongyu [2 ]
Lan, Yuxuan [2 ]
Du, Keze [2 ]
Liu, Yue [2 ]
机构
[1] Sichuan Normal Univ, Visual Comp & Virtual Real Key Lab Sichuan Prov, Chengdu 610068, Peoples R China
[2] Sichuan Normal Univ, Sch Business, Chengdu 610068, Peoples R China
关键词
Disabled tourism; government; tourism enterprise; evolutionary game;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
G40 [教育学];
学科分类号
040101 ; 120403 ;
摘要
As the state leaders are caring more about the people's livelihood problem, the disabled accessible tourism is getting more and more attention from domestic scholars and the public. Government departments and tourism enterprises are acknowledged as the important responsibilities which the disabled contact with directly in the development of the disabled tourism. Therefore, the article selects the two major stakeholders to construct the dynamic evolutionary game model: government and tourism enterprises, dissects the respective evolutionary stable strategy of these two parties and key influence factors in the process of game. The research results show that two stakeholders' final choices of strategy depend on the initial payoff matrix game and the influence of key parameters. The government should intensify the propaganda of encouragement policy and the publicity of tourism enterprises which implemented and supported the disabled tourism, reduce allowance for tourism industry as a whole. Tourism enterprises and tourist attractions should strengthen the personnel training on the professional services for the disabled.
引用
收藏
页码:363 / 367
页数:5
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