Drivers of political parties' voting behaviour in European economic governance: the ultimate decline of the economic cleavage?

被引:8
|
作者
Maatsch, Aleksandra [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Max Planck Inst Study Soc, Cologne, Germany
[2] Univ Cambridge, Dept Polit & Int Studies, Cambridge CB2 1TN, England
关键词
Political parties; vote outcome; European economic governance; EFSF; ESM; Fiscal Compact; GOVERNMENT; STABILITY;
D O I
10.1080/01402382.2015.1129491
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
The article examines the factors that determined the attitude of parliamentary parties towards eurozone anti-crisis measures. Using a statistical logit model, it demonstrates that, while all governing parties supported such measures, opposition parties were divided. The support of the former is explicable in terms of international obligations. The positions of opposition parties reflected their attitude towards European integration: Eurosceptic parties tended to oppose anti-crisis measures. Furthermore, whereas negative votes were less likely in countries marked by higher levels of popular trust in government and satisfaction with the problem-solving capacity of the EU, the likelihood of no votes increased as a function of the level of trust in national parliaments. The policy preferences of opposition parties, measured on the economic left-right scale, did not provide significant explanatory potential; nor did an additional test measuring the impact of extreme left. right positions.
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页码:648 / 666
页数:19
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