VOLUNTARY REMANDS: A CRITICAL REASSESSMENT

被引:0
|
作者
Revesz, Joshua [1 ]
机构
[1] Yale Law Sch, New Haven, CT 06511 USA
关键词
ADMINISTRATIVE-LAW; FEDERAL-GOVERNMENT; RULEMAKING; AGENCIES; ARBITRARY; APPEALS; COURTS; PLACE; JUDGE; REIGN;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
D9 [法律]; DF [法律];
学科分类号
0301 ;
摘要
This Article explores and critiques the administrative law doctrine of voluntary remand. When petitioners challenge an agency policy, the agency may ask the reviewing court to return the policy to the agency for reconsideration-effectively terminating the court's role in the case. Voluntary-remand motions risk agency opportunism and political manipulation but are nevertheless routinely and uncritically granted by courts. The Article explores the theory and history of voluntary-remand doctrine, observing that modern administrative law developments negate many of the doctrine's core assumptions. Accordingly, the Article calls for reassessing courts' willingness to grant voluntary remands.
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页码:361 / 408
页数:48
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