Technology transfer with transboundary pollution: A signalling approach

被引:6
|
作者
Hong, Fuhai [1 ]
机构
[1] Nanyang Technol Univ, Div Econ, Singapore, Singapore
关键词
O33; Q54; INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS; NORTH; SOUTH; INCENTIVES;
D O I
10.1111/caje.12102
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
There are increasing complaints from the developing world that developed countries seem reluctant to transfer green technology, despite its benefits in helping to solve the climate problem. Identifying a signalling effect of technology transfer that was neglected by the previous literature, this paper offers a rationale for this reluctance in a North-South model with transboundary pollution. In a benchmark case with complete information, the North makes complete technology transfer, leading to a Pareto improvement. However, if the North's valuation on climate damage is its private information, the North does not completely transfer the technology in almost all of the equilibria. Resume Transfert de technologie quand il y a pollution transfrontiere: une approche en termes de signaux. Il y a de plus en plus de plaintes dans le monde en developpement que les pays developpes sont reticents a transferer la technologie verte, malgre les avantages que cela procurerait pour aider a resoudre les problemes lies aux changements climatiques. Identifiant cet effet de signalisation du transfert de technologie qui a ete neglige dans la litterature specialisee, ce texte suggere des raisons pour expliquer cette reticence dans un modele Nord-Sud avec pollution transfrontiere. Dans un cas de figure avec information complete, le Nord effectue un transfert complet de technologie, menant a une amelioration a la Pareto. Cependant si l'evaluation du dommage cause par le climat est son information privee, le Nord ne transfere pas completement la technologie dans presque tous les equilibres.
引用
收藏
页码:953 / 980
页数:28
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