Rule-Based Reasoning Is Fast and Belief-Based Reasoning Can Be Slow: Challenging Current Explanations of Belief-Bias and Base-Rate Neglect

被引：77

作者：

Newman, Ian R. ^{[1
]}

Gibb, Maia ^{[2
]}

Thompson, Valerie A. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Saskatchewan, Dept Psychol, 9 Campus Dr, Saskatoon, SK S7N 5A5, Canada

[2] Univ Saskatchewan, Dept Educ Psychol, Saskatoon, SK, Canada

来源：

JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY-LEARNING MEMORY AND COGNITION | 2017年 / 43卷 / 07期

基金：

加拿大自然科学与工程研究理事会;

关键词：

dual process theories of reasoning; belief bias; base-rate neglect; DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES; COGNITIVE REFLECTION; CONFLICT; LOGIC; RATIONALITY; PSYCHOLOGY; HEURISTICS; ACCOUNTS;

D O I：

10.1037/xlm0000372

中图分类号：

B84 [心理学];

学科分类号：

04 ; 0402 ;

摘要：

It is commonly assumed that belief-based reasoning is fast and automatic, whereas rule-based reasoning is slower and more effortful. Dual-Process theories of reasoning rely on this speed-asymmetry explanation to account for a number of reasoning phenomena, such as base-rate neglect and belief-bias. The goal of the current study was to test this hypothesis about the relative speed of belief-based and rule-based processes. Participants solved base-rate problems (Experiment 1) and conditional inferences (Experiment 2) under a challenging deadline; they then gave a second response in free time. We found that fast responses were informed by rules of probability and logical validity, and that slow responses incorporated belief-based information. Implications for Dual-Process theories and future research options for dissociating Type I and Type II processes are discussed.

引用

页码：1154 / 1170

页数：17