Multilateral matching (vol 156, pg 175, 2015)

被引：2
|
作者：
Bando, Keisuke [1 ,2 ]
Hirai, Toshiyuki [3 ]
Hatfield, John William [4 ]
Kominers, Scott Duke [5 ,6 ,7 ]
机构：
[1] Shinshu Univ, Fac Econ & Law, Matsumoto, Nagano, Japan
[2] Shinshu Univ, Dept Econ, Matsumoto, Nagano, Japan
[3] Hosei Univ, Fac Econ, Tokyo, Japan
[4] Univ Texas Austin, McCombs Sch Business, Austin, TX 78712 USA
[5] Harvard Univ, Harvard Business Sch, Dept Econ, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[6] Harvard Univ, Ctr Math Sci & Applicat, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[7] Natl Bur Econ Res, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
来源：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 2019年 / 184卷
基金：
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词：
Matching; Networks; Joint ventures; Stability; Competitive equilibrium;
D O I：
10.1016/j.jet.2019.08.003
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We identify an error in the claim by Hatfield and Kominers (2015) that every stable outcome in the setting of multilateral matching with contracts is efficient. We then show that the result can be recovered under a suitable differentiability condition. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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页数：5
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