Changing Nuclear Capabilities and Strategy between the United States and North Korea

Continuous development of North Korea's nuclear capabilities and the accompanying concern about the possible decoupling of the alliance between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the United States have produced numerous opinions on what should be done about North Korea's nuclear program. While there are discussions on conceptual possibilities of deterrent or compellent use of nuclear weapons by North Korea, these discussions often fall short of making specific connections between the relational nuclear capabilities between North Korea and the United States, and their nuclear strategies. Such connection is necessary in grasping a clear picture of the nuclear security environment of the Korean Peninsula, and formulating possible policy responses the ROK should adopt as a result. This article seeks to make this connection by analyzing the nuclear capabilities and strategy of North Korea and the United States. It argues that North Korea will be able to pressure alliance decoupling only if it is able to field submarine-based ballistic missiles with an inter-continental range. The ROK should seek to avoid this outcome by strengthening its own deterrence measures against North Korea, seeking assurances on the U.S. alliance commitment, and seeking measures that could reverse North Korea's potential second-strike capability.