Dynamic semi-consistency

被引：0
|
作者：
Bade, Sophie [1 ,2 ,3 ]
机构：
[1] Univ London, Royal Holloway Coll, London, England
[2] Max Planck Inst Res Collect Goods, Bonn, Germany
[3] Univ London, Royal Holloway Coll, Belfast, North Ireland
来源：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2022年 / 134卷
关键词：
Ambiguity aversion; Dynamic consistency; Games with incomplete information; EXPECTED UTILITY; AMBIGUITY; RANDOMIZATION; PREFERENCES; BELIEFS; CHOICE; DESIGN; SAVAGE;
D O I：
10.1016/j.geb.2022.04.001
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
Semi-consistent conditional preferences are inconsistent enough for different ambiguity attitudes to manifest themselves in different behavior and consistent enough for information to be generically valuable. To simultaneously achieve these two desiderata I assume exactly one type of dynamic inconsistency: agents do not update their preferences upon learning independent randomization outcomes. (c) 2022 Published by Elsevier Inc.
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页码：117 / 126
页数：10
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