Central Banks at War

被引:28
|
作者
Poast, Paul [1 ]
机构
[1] Rutgers State Univ, New Brunswick, NJ 08903 USA
关键词
EFFECTS VECTOR DECOMPOSITION; FREE-RIDER PROBLEM; SOVEREIGN DEBT; GOLD STANDARD; DEMOCRATIC ADVANTAGE; TIME-INVARIANT; CENTURIES; MARKETS; MODELS; INSTITUTIONS;
D O I
10.1017/S0020818314000265
中图分类号
D81 [国际关系];
学科分类号
030207 ;
摘要
War is expensivetroops must be equipped and weapons must be procured. When the enormous borrowing requirements of war make the sovereigns' credibility problem more difficult, central banks enhance a government's ability to borrow. By being the sole direct purchaser of government debt, the central bank increases the effective punishment that can be imposed on the government for defaulting on the marginal lender. This increases lenders' confidence that the government will be punished in case of default, making lenders willing to purchase the debt at a lower rate of interest. The sovereign, dependent on the low borrowing costs offered by the central bank, has an incentive to retain the bank. Data covering the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries reveal that possessing a central bank lowers the sovereign's borrowing costs, particularly during times of war.
引用
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页码:63 / 95
页数:33
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