THE RATIONALIZATION OF CENTRAL BANKS

被引:3
|
作者
SELGIN, G
机构
[1] Department of Economics, University of Georgia, Athens
关键词
D O I
10.1080/08913819308443303
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
Charles Goodhart's The Evolution of Central Banks represents a rare and welcome attempt to spell out those shortcomings of 'free banking'' that supply a rationale for the establishment of central banks. However, one of Goodhart's principal arguments - that central banks are practically inevitable outgrowths of the ''natural'' tendency for bank reserves to become concentrated in a dominant ''bankers' bank'' - understates the role legal restrictions have played in sponsoring the emergence of bankers' banks, including the Bank of England. Some of Goodhart's other arguments against free banking rest on an exaggerated view of the likelihood of business cycles and financial crises under free banking as compared with central banking.
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页码:335 / 354
页数:20
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