Managerial Shareholding and CSR: Does Internal Control Quality Matter?-Evidence from China

被引:9
|
作者
Guo, Mingyuan [1 ]
Shen, Shuyu [1 ]
机构
[1] Tianjin Univ, Coll Management & Econ, Tianjin 300072, Peoples R China
关键词
managerial shareholding; CSR; internal control quality; mandatory disclosure; voluntary disclosure; panel data models; CORPORATE SOCIAL-RESPONSIBILITY; PERFORMANCE; CEO; ANTECEDENTS; INFORMATION; PERSPECTIVE; INCENTIVES; GOVERNANCE; DISCLOSURE; INVESTMENT;
D O I
10.3390/su11154206
中图分类号
X [环境科学、安全科学];
学科分类号
08 ; 0830 ;
摘要
This paper uses the data of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) performance of A-share listed companies in China from 2013-2017 as sample to study on the impacts of managerial shareholding on CSR performance. By dividing the sample into mandatory disclosure group and voluntary disclosure group, we first empirically test the impacts of managerial shareholding on CSR performance. Then, we discuss the role of internal control quality in the impacts of managerial shareholding on CSR performance. Panel data models are employed in the empirical research and robust test. The empirical results show that: Firstly, in mandatory disclosure group, managerial shareholding has no significant impacts on CSR performance. In voluntary disclosure group, managerial shareholding has a positive impact on CSR performance. Secondly, in voluntary disclosure group, internal control quality has a positive role in the impacts of managerial shareholding on CSR performance, but this positive role cannot be supported empirically in mandatory disclosure group. Overall, these findings indicate that CSR performance is influenced by managerial shareholding and varies with CSR disclosure behaviors. The results of robust test also support this conclusion. Finally, we put forward that it would be a good choice for the companies to implement long-term equity incentives and improve internal control quality to promote CSR performance.
引用
收藏
页数:21
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