Discussion of "The dynamic effects of antitrust policy on growth and welfare"

被引:0
|
作者
Philippon, Thomas [1 ]
机构
[1] NYU, 44 West Fourth St 9-03, New York, NY 10012 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1016/j.jmoneco.2021.04.004
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Cavenaile et al. (2021) study the long-run implications of anti-trust policy for innovation, output and welfare using a general equilibrium model. Their approach differs from the much of the existing literature that focuses on short-run, partial equilibrium effects. Their model combines three key elements: (i) endogenous growth with vertical innovations; (ii) oligopolistic competition in the product market; (iii) endogenous M&As. I will briefly discuss their paper and then compare it to Mermelstein et al. (2020) who also study optimal merger policy in a dynamic model. (C) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码:60 / 61
页数:2
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