The Dynamic Effects of Antitrust Policy on Growth and Welfare

被引:7
|
作者
Cavenaile, Laurent [1 ,2 ]
Celik, Murat Alp [3 ]
Tian, Xu [4 ]
机构
[1] Univ Toronto Scarborough, Dept Management, Scarborough, ON, Canada
[2] Univ Toronto, Rotman Sch Management, Toronto, ON, Canada
[3] Univ Toronto, Dept Econ, Toronto, ON, Canada
[4] Univ Georgia, Terry Coll Business, Dept Finance, Athens, GA 30602 USA
关键词
Antitrust policy; Mergers and acquisitions; Innovation; Growth; Social welfare; HORIZONTAL MERGERS; COMPETITION POLICY; CONSOLIDATION; INNOVATION; INDUSTRIES; ECONOMIES; MODEL;
D O I
10.1016/j.jmoneco.2021.04.011
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
To study the dynamic effects of antitrust policy on growth and welfare, we develop and estimate the first general equilibrium model with Schumpeterian innovation, oligopolistic product market competition, and endogenous M&A decisions. The estimated model reveals that: (1) Existing policies generate gains in growth and welfare. (2) Strengthening antitrust enforcement could deliver substantially higher gains. (3) The dynamic long-run effects of antitrust policy on social welfare are an order of magnitude larger than the static gains from higher allocative efficiency in production. (4) Current HHI-based antitrust rules leave the majority of anticompetitive acquisitions undetected, highlighting the need for alternative guidelines. (c) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:42 / 59
页数:18
相关论文
共 50 条