Probability matching and strategic decision making

被引：2
|
作者：
Kim, Duk Gyoo [1 ]
Kim, Hee Chun [2 ]
机构：
[1] Sungkyunkwan Univ, Dept Econ, Seoul, South Korea
[2] Korea Informat Soc Dev Inst, Jincheon Gun, Chungcheongbuk, South Korea
来源：
JOURNAL OF BEHAVIORAL AND EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS | 2022年 / 98卷
关键词：
Level-k reasoning; Probability matching; Cognitive bound; Preference for randomization; STOCHASTIC CHOICE; BEHAVIOR; PREFERENCES; COGNITION; GAMES;
D O I：
10.1016/j.socec.2022.101850
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This paper examines a link between an individual's (possibly limited) strategic thinking in the 11-20 money request game and (possibly non-rational) decision-making patterns in the matching pennies games. Experimental evidence shows that subjects' strategic behavior, which used to be understood as a result of finite cognitive iterations, is closely related to their choice randomization patterns. Ignoring some individuals' choice randomization may bias the population variance of levels in cognitive iterations. Choice randomizers, which we call probability matchers, are non-rational in both the non-strategic and strategic settings, but their choice patterns are systematic-although inconsistent with rational decisions-and similar.
引用
收藏
页数：10
相关论文
共 50 条
12345