Vertical Bargaining and Retail Competition: What Drives Countervailing Power?

被引：32
|
作者：
Gaudin, Germain [1 ,2 ]
机构：
[1] European Commiss, Directorate Gen Competit, Pl Madou 1, B-1210 St Josse Ten Noode, Belgium
[2] Heinrich Heine Univ, Dusseldorf Inst Competit Econ, Dusseldorf, Germany
来源：
ECONOMIC JOURNAL | 2018年 / 128卷 / 614期
关键词：
PRICE-DISCRIMINATION; BUYER POWER; BILATERAL CONTRACTS; EMPIRICAL-EVIDENCE; MARKET CONDITIONS; DOWNSTREAM ENTRY; MEDICAL DEVICES; PASS-THROUGH; MERGERS; INDUSTRY;
D O I：
10.1111/ecoj.12506
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This article investigates the effects of changes in market concentration on the equilibrium prices in a supply chain. Results are derived from a theoretical model of bilateral bargaining between upstream and downstream firms which allows for general forms of demand and retail competition. Whether countervailing buyer power arises, in the form of lower input prices following greater concentration downstream, depends on the pass-through rate of input prices to retail prices. Countervailing buyer power generally does not translate into lower retail prices because of heightened market power at the retail level.
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页码：2380 / 2413
页数：34
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