Analysis of principal-agent of enterprise

被引：0

作者：

Shi, JP ^{[1
]}

Li, BQ ^{[1
]}

Li, F ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Hubei Univ, Sch Econ, Wuhan 430062, Peoples R China

来源：

'99 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MANAGEMENT SCIENCE & ENGINEERING, PROCEEDINGS, VOLS 1 AND 2 | 1999年

关键词：

principal-agent; principal; agent; ownership; right of control;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

T [工业技术];

学科分类号：

08 ;

摘要：

Company institution of modem enterprise is actually principal-agent which result from the separation of right of control from ownership when partnership and company institution grow and developed from proprietor system. Highly developed social. productivity and specialization of management bring about the principal-agent relationship, which exists only when the principal entrusts an agent with control and the latter is responsible for the increment of the property.

引用

页码：840 / 843

页数：4

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