In recent years, most states have constructed elaborate accountability systems using school-level test scores. However, because the median elementary school contains only 69 children per grade level, such measures are quite imprecise. We evaluate the implications for school accountability systems. For instance, rewards or sanctions for schools with scores at either extreme primarily affect small schools and provide weak incentives to large ones. Nevertheless, we conclude that accountability systems may be worthwhile. Even in states with aggressive financial incentives, the marginal reward to schools for raising student performance is a small fraction of the potential labor market value for students.
机构:
Univ Calif Berkeley, Howard Hughes Med Inst, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA
Univ Calif Berkeley, Dept Mol & Cell Biol, Berkeley, CA 94720 USAUniv Calif Berkeley, Howard Hughes Med Inst, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA
Steenwyk, Jacob L.
King, Nicole
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Univ Calif Berkeley, Howard Hughes Med Inst, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA
Univ Calif Berkeley, Dept Mol & Cell Biol, Berkeley, CA 94720 USAUniv Calif Berkeley, Howard Hughes Med Inst, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA
机构:
Worldwatch Institute, 1776 Massachusetts Avenue, Washington, DC 20036-1904, United StatesWorldwatch Institute, 1776 Massachusetts Avenue, Washington, DC 20036-1904, United States
Renner, Michael
McKeown, Alice
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Worldwatch Institute, 1776 Massachusetts Avenue, Washington, DC 20036-1904, United StatesWorldwatch Institute, 1776 Massachusetts Avenue, Washington, DC 20036-1904, United States