Correlated quantal responses and equilibrium selection

被引：5
|
作者：
Ui, Takashi [1 ]
机构：
[1] Yokohama Natl Univ, Fac Econ, Hodogaya Ku, Yokohama, Kanagawa 2408501, Japan
来源：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2006年 / 57卷 / 02期
关键词：
global game; quantal response equilibrium;
D O I：
10.1016/j.geb.2005.08.018
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This paper considers incomplete information games with payoffs subject to correlated random disturbances. It explains the connection between the uniqueness of quantal response equilibria, where large noise is required, and the uniqueness of equilibria in global games, where small noise is required. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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页码：361 / 369
页数：9
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