First price package auction with many traders

This paper studies a first price package auction in which multiple sellers participate in addition to multiple buyers. We generalize the notion of the profit-target strategy which is first introduced as a truthful strategy in a first price package auction with a single seller by Bernheim and Whinston (1986b). We then show that the set of equilibrium payoffs in profit-target strategies is equal to the bidder-optimal core, and is also equal to the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria. Using this result, we find that any equilibrium payoff vector is weakly Pareto-dominated by the VCG payoff vector for buyers, and that the Walrasian competitive equilibrium payoff vector is weakly Pareto-dominated by some equilibrium payoff vector for buyers, even if goods are substitutes. This contrasts with the first price package auction with a single seller, in which it is shown that if goods are substitutes, then those three outcomes are payoff-equivalent. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.