On some properties of Nash equilibrium points in two-person games

被引：0
|
作者：
Nikol'skii, M. S. [1 ]
机构：
[1] Russian Acad Sci, Steklov Math Inst, Ul Gubkina 8, Moscow 119991, Russia
来源：
PROCEEDINGS OF THE STEKLOV INSTITUTE OF MATHEMATICS | 2015年 / 291卷 / 01期
基金：
俄罗斯科学基金会;
关键词：
Nash Equilibrium; STEKLOV Institute; Nash Equilibrium Point; Nonempty Compact Subset; Continuous Scalar Function;
D O I：
10.1134/S0081543815080180
中图分类号：
O29 [应用数学];
学科分类号：
070104 ;
摘要：
In modern game theory, a lot of attention is paid to the concept of Nash equilibrium. The paper is devoted to the study of some properties of the set A of Nash equilibrium points in two-person games. In particular, the character of possible complexity of the set A is investigated, and the stability of the set A under small perturbations of payoff functions is analyzed.
引用
收藏
页码：232 / 236
页数：5
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