In social dilemma situations, each individual always receives a higher payoff for defecting than for cooperating, but all are better off if all cooperate than if all defect. Often, however, people in social dilemmas attend more to the group's payoffs than to their own, either automatically or to behave "appropriately." But whereas social identity elicits cooperative behaviour in dilemmas, it is generally only for the benefit of an "in-group." Dilemmas between groups (requiring self-sacrificial behaviour within) are often the most extreme. Consequently, the framing and manipulation of group identity is critical to cooperation rate as demonstrated by careful laboratory experimentation.
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Univ Jaume 1, LEE, Castellon de La Plana 12071, Spain
Univ Jaume 1, Dept Econ, Castellon de La Plana 12071, Spain
eEdificio Invest 2,Avda Sos Baynat S-N, Castellon de La Plana 12071, SpainUniv Jaume 1, LEE, Castellon de La Plana 12071, Spain
Barreda-Tarrazona, Ivan
Garcia-Gallego, Aurora
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Univ Jaume 1, LEE, Castellon de La Plana 12071, Spain
Univ Jaume 1, Dept Econ, Castellon de La Plana 12071, Spain
eEdificio Invest 2,Avda Sos Baynat S-N, Castellon de La Plana 12071, SpainUniv Jaume 1, LEE, Castellon de La Plana 12071, Spain
Garcia-Gallego, Aurora
Georgantzis, Nikolaos
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Univ Jaume 1, LEE, Castellon de La Plana 12071, Spain
BSB, Sch Wine & Spirits Business, Dijon, France
Burgundy Sch Business, Sch Wine Spirits Business, 29 Rue Sambin BP50608, F-21006 Dijon, FranceUniv Jaume 1, LEE, Castellon de La Plana 12071, Spain
Georgantzis, Nikolaos
Ziros, Nicholas
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Univ Cyprus, Dept Econ, POB 20537, CY-1678 Nicosia, CyprusUniv Jaume 1, LEE, Castellon de La Plana 12071, Spain