Executive compensation and capital structure: The effects of convertible debt and straight debt on CEO pay

被引:72
|
作者
Ortiz-Molina, Hernan [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ British Columbia, Dept Geog, Sauder Sch Business, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z2, Canada
来源
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS | 2007年 / 43卷 / 01期
关键词
executive compensation; corporate governance; agency problems; capital structure;
D O I
10.1016/j.jacceco.2006.09.003
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
I examine how CEO compensation is related to firms' capital structures. My tests address the simultaneity of these decisions and distinguish between debt types with different theoretical implications for managerial incentives. Pay-performance sensitivity decreases in straight-debt leverage, but is higher in firms with convertible debt. Furthermore, stock option policy is the component of CEO pay that is most sensitive to differences in capital structure. The results strongly support the hypothesis that firms trade-off shareholder-manager incentive alignment in order to mitigate shareholder-bondholder conflicts of interest. The hypothesis that debt reduces manager-shareholder conflicts can explain some but not all of the results. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:69 / 93
页数:25
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