A note on public debt, tax-exempt bonds, and Ponzi games

被引:6
|
作者
Wigger, Berthold U. [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Erlangen Nurnberg, Dept Econ, D-90403 Nurnberg, Germany
关键词
Public debt; Tax-exempt bonds; Capital taxation; Ponzi game; OVERLAPPING-GENERATIONS; DYNAMIC INEFFICIENCY; ENDOGENOUS GROWTH; ASSET BUBBLES; MODEL;
D O I
10.1016/j.jmacro.2008.07.003
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
By issuing tax-exempt bonds, the government can incur debt and never pay back any principal or interest, even if the economy without public debt evolves on a dynamically efficient growth path. The welfare effects of such a Ponzi type borrowing scheme are mixed. The current young will unambiguously benefit. Depending on preferences and the aggregate technology, a finite number of subsequent generations may also benefit. However, the welfare of all generations thereafter will be lower than in the economy without public debt. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:492 / 499
页数:8
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