Long-term contracts in the NHS: A solution in search of a problem?

被引:0
|
作者
Dawson, D [1 ]
Goddard, M [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ York, Ctr Hlth Econ, York YO10 5DD, N Yorkshire, England
关键词
contracting; markets; internal market;
D O I
10.1002/(SICI)1099-1050(199912)8:8<709::AID-HEC482>3.0.CO;2-0
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Purchasers and providers in the National Health Service (NHS) are now required to move from annual contracting cycles to longer-term contracts. The benefits are expected to include more efficient investment and improved sharing of financial risk. This paper argues that the economic analysis of longer-term contracts has assumed implicitly that agents operate in the private sector. Once the constraints of the public sector are introduced, the apparent economic benefits of longer-term contracts become doubtful. The paper explores these issues using evidence collected from analysis of the contracts of a sample of Health Authorities and from semi-structured interviews with individuals involved in the contracting process. We conclude that with the property rights and financial structure of the public sector, the move from short- to long-term contracts is unlikely to produce the improvements in performance expected by the government. Copyright (C) 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
引用
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页码:709 / 720
页数:12
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