Rivalry between airport ancillary and city-center supplies

被引：6
|
作者：
Czerny, Achim, I [1 ]
Zhang, Hanxiang [1 ]
机构：
[1] Hong Kong Polytech Univ, Dept Logist & Maritime Studies, Hung Hom, Kowloon, Li Ka Shing Tower, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
来源：
TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH PART E-LOGISTICS AND TRANSPORTATION REVIEW | 2020年 / 141卷
关键词：
Airport privatization; City-center rivalry; Ancillary goods; Myopic passengers; Foresighted passengers; CONCESSION REVENUES; MARKET POWER; SINGLE-TILL; CONGESTION; CAPACITY; MODEL; ADD; ECONOMICS; IMPACT;
D O I：
10.1016/j.tre.2020.101987
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
Passengers can buy souvenirs or rent a car at the airport or in the city-center. This paper develops a basic model with unit demands for airport ancillary and city-center demands to derive equilibrium pricing strategies of profit-maximizing airports and city-center companies and evaluates them from the social viewpoint. Passengers are myopic in the sense that only ticket prices matter for flight decisions or foresighted in the sense that non-aeronautical airport and city-center supplies matter for flight decisions, too. We find that the welfare evaluation of equilibrium airport pricing behavior can be independent of whether passengers are myopic or foresighted.
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页数：17
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