Seasoned Equity Offerings, Corporate Governance, and Investments

被引:39
|
作者
Kim, E. Han [1 ]
Purnanandam, Amiyatosh [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Michigan, Ross Sch Business, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA
关键词
MANAGERIAL DISCRETION; OPPORTUNITIES; ACQUISITIONS; INFORMATION; INCENTIVES; DECISIONS; RETURNS; ISSUES; GAINS; FIRMS;
D O I
10.1093/rof/rft012
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We find weak governance is a primary reason investors react negatively to the announcement of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find investors worry about nonproductive use of SEO proceeds when external pressure for good governance lifts due to an external shock. Investors react negatively only when treated firms raise funds to increase capital investments. Market reaction is more negative when issuers have prior records of value-reducing acquisitions and weaker managerial wealth sensitivity to shareholder value. The magnitudes of these governance effects are surprisingly large, explaining most of the previously documented negative market reactions to primary SEOs.
引用
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页码:1023 / 1057
页数:35
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