Explaining corruption: An institutional choice approach

The end of the Cold War, the strengthening of world democracy, and the advancement of neoliberal economic reforms, have exposed corruption as a major world problem and spawned a plethora of international and national anti-corruption programs. Past theorizing has increased our knowledge about corruption, however, an interdisciplinary (political, economic, cultural) theory of the causes of political corruption has never emerged. This article develops a middle-range interdisciplinary theory of the causes of corruption built through employment of an institutional choice analytic frame. The analytic frame draws on the Institutional Analysis and Development work of Elinor Ostrom, Roy Gardner, & James Walker, and the constructivist work of Nicholas Onuf. The resultant theory is advanced through a statistical analysis. The article concludes that ongoing international and national anti-corruption programs will likely fail unless they include reforms to state internal power structures and political cultures.