Compliance with goodwill-related mandatory disclosure requirements and the cost of equity capital

被引:53
|
作者
Mazzi, Francesco [1 ]
Andre, Paul [2 ]
Dionysiou, Dionysia [3 ]
Tsalavoutas, Ioannis [4 ]
机构
[1] Univ Florence, Econ & Management Sch, Accounting & Finance Div, Via Pangette 9, I-50127 Florence, Italy
[2] UNIL, HEC Lausanne, CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland
[3] Univ Stirling, Stirling Management Sch, Accounting & Finance Div, Stirling FK9 4LA, Scotland
[4] Univ Glasgow, Adam Smith Business Sch, Main Bldg,Univ Ave, Glasgow G12 8QQ, Lanark, Scotland
关键词
accounting disclosure; compliance; cost of equity capital; goodwill; IAS; 36; IFRS; 3; impairments; INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS; EARNINGS MANAGEMENT; IMPLIED COST; INFORMATION ASYMMETRY; VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE; MARKET REACTION; EXPECTED RATE; IFRS; ADOPTION; INCENTIVES;
D O I
10.1080/00014788.2016.1254593
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Theory suggests that increased levels of corporate disclosure lead to a decrease in cost of equity via the reduction of estimation risk. We examine compliance levels with International Financial Reporting Standard 3 Business Combinations and International Accounting Standard 36 Impairments of Assets mandated goodwill-related disclosure and their association with firms' implied cost of equity capital (ICC). Using a sample of European firms for the period 2008-2011, we find a median compliance level of about 83% and significant differences in compliance levels across firms and time. Non-compliance relates mostly to proprietary information and information that reveals managers' judgement and expectations. Overall, we find a statistically significant negative relationship between the ICC and compliance with mandated goodwill-related disclosure. Further, we split the sample between firms meeting (or not) market expectations about the recognition of a goodwill impairment loss in a given year to study whether variation in compliance levels mainly plays a confirmatory or a mediatory role. We find the latter: higher compliance levels matter only for the sub-sample of firms that do not meet market expectations regarding goodwill impairment. Finally, our results hold only in countries where enforcement is strong.
引用
收藏
页码:268 / 312
页数:45
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