We explore similarities in insider trading as a proxy for information flows. We observe that corporate insiders cluster trades around those of other insiders at their firm, especially around trades of insiders with whom they work closely. Clustering is greater when informational advantages are larger: during periods of low investor attention, high uncertainty, and high information asymmetry. We also document that clustered insider purchases are followed by abnormal returns in excess of 2% during the subsequent month. Our results are consistent with informed trading, which could result from information sharing among corporate insiders.
机构:
Zhongnan Univ Econ & Law, Sch Finance, Wuhan, Peoples R ChinaZhongnan Univ Econ & Law, Sch Finance, Wuhan, Peoples R China
Du, Shiyan
Lin, Wenlian
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Chinese Univ Hong Kong, Sch Management & Econ, Shenzhen, Peoples R ChinaZhongnan Univ Econ & Law, Sch Finance, Wuhan, Peoples R China
Lin, Wenlian
Pan, Jingchen
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Chinese Univ Hong Kong, Sch Management & Econ, Shenzhen, Peoples R China
Univ Sci & Technol China, Sch Management, Hefei, Peoples R ChinaZhongnan Univ Econ & Law, Sch Finance, Wuhan, Peoples R China
机构:
China Foreign Affairs Univ, Sch Int Econ, 24,Zhanlan Rd, Beijing 100037, Peoples R ChinaChina Foreign Affairs Univ, Sch Int Econ, 24,Zhanlan Rd, Beijing 100037, Peoples R China
Li, Tao
Ji, Yu
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Beihang Univ, Sch Econ & Management, 37 Xueyuan Rd, Beijing 100191, Peoples R ChinaChina Foreign Affairs Univ, Sch Int Econ, 24,Zhanlan Rd, Beijing 100037, Peoples R China